Research


                                                                                                                                                                                    December, 2011

Dissertation

Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Bargaining Institutions.
Dissertation Committee Co-Chairs: Professor Linda Babcock (Carnegie Mellon University) and Professor John Duffy (University of Pittsburgh), 2002. 

Publications

Book Chapters Requested

[1] Contracts and Markets, in Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum, eds., The Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.
 
[2] Litigation and Tort Reform, in Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum, eds., The Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.  
 
[3] Liability and Litigation, in Thomas Miceli and Matthew Baker, eds., The Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming.  

Journal Articles

[4] Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results (with Kathryn E. Spier), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
 
[Presentations: Max Planck/University of Bonn Seminar on Contracts, June 2011; Annual Meetings of the American Law and Economics
Association, May 2011.]

Abstract   

   This paper reports further experimental results on exclusive dealing contracts. We extend Landeo and Spier's [2009] work by studying Naked Exclusion in a strategic environment that involves a four-player, two-stage game. In addition to the roles of seller and buyers, our experimental environment includes the role of a potential entrant (a fourth passive player). Our findings are as follows. First, payoff endogeneity increases the likelihood of exclusion. Second, communication between the potential entrant and the buyers increases buyers' coordination on their preferred equilibrium (equilibrium with entry) and hence, reduces the likelihood of exclusion. Entrant-buyers communication also induces more generous offers.

[5] Incentives and Contract Frames: Comment (with Kathryn E. Spier). Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
 
[Presentations: Max Planck/University of Bonn Seminar on Contracts, June 2011.]

Abstract     

Principal-agent problems are pervasive in economic settings. CEOs and shareholders, lawyers and clients, manufacturers and retailers, lenders and borrowers are all examples of settings in which moral hazard problems might arise. Incentive contracts in both individual and team environments have been studied by economists (see Shavell (1979) and Holmstrom (1982, 1979) for seminal theoretical work, and Prendergast (1999) for a survey of empirical literature). Contracts that tie an agent's compensation to performance, such as conditional bonus schemes, have been proposed as a way to align the interests of agents and principals. Experimental literature from economics and social psychology suggests that the way choices are framed can affect decisions as well. Hence, contract frames might influence the effectiveness of incentive schemes. This comment first outlines seminal experimental work on frames and describes a recent study that relates the incentive contract literature with the experimental work on frames. Second, it discusses the experimental design and findings of Brooks, Stremitzer, and Tontrup's (2011) work on individual incentives and contract frames.

[6] Trigger Happy or Gun Shy: Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts, with Kathryn E. Spier and Richard Brooks, RAND Journal of Economics, 41, 2010, pp. 649-673.
 
[Additional Appendices]
 
[Presentations: Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, University of Southern California, November 2009; Annual Meetings of
the American Law and Economics Association, May 2009.]

Abstract   

   The operating agreements of many business ventures include clauses to facilitate the exit of joint owners. In so-called Texas Shootouts, one owner names a single buy-sell price and the other owner is compelled to either buy or sell shares at that named price. Despite their prevalence in real-world contracts, Texas Shootouts are rarely triggered. In our theoretical framework, sole ownership is more efficient than joint ownership. Negotiations are frustrated, however, by the presence of asymmetric information. In equilibrium, owners eschew buy-sell offers in favor of simple offers to buy or to sell shares and bargaining failures arise. Experimental data support these findings.

[7] Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities, with Kathryn Spier, American Economic Review, 99, 2009, pp. 1850-1877.
 
[NBER Working Paper No. 14115; Harvard University, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 604.]
 
[Presentations: Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Cornell University, September 2008; NBER, Summer Institute in Law and Economics,
July 2008; North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, Carnegie Mellon University, June 2008; Annual Meetings of the
Canadian Economic Association (invited session, Phelps Centre, UBC), University of British Columbia, June 2008; Annual Meetings of the
American Law and Economics Association, Columbia University, May 2008; The Economics of Business and the Law Symposium,
University of Texas at Austin, April 2008; Department of Economics, UDEP, December 2007; Harvard University, Law, Economics and
Organization Seminar, November 2007; Georgetown University, Law and Economics Workshop, November 2007; North American Regional
Conference of the Economic Science Association, Tucson, October 2007.]

Abstract   

   This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with
exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000)
where entry is unprofitable when sufficiently many downstream buyers sign exclusive contracts with the incumbent. When discrimination is
impossible, the game resembles a stag-hunt (coordination) game in which the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen by the incumbent seller. 
Exclusion occurs when the buyers fail to coordinate on their preferred equilibrium. Two-way non-binding pre-play communication among
the buyers lowers the power of exclusive contracts and induces more generous contract terms from the seller.  When discrimination and
communication are possible, the exclusion rate rises. Divide-and-conquer strategies are observed more frequently when buyers can communicate
with each other. Exclusion rates are significantly higher when the buyers' payoffs are endogenously chosen rather than exogenously given.
Finally, secret offers are shown to decrease the incumbent's power to profitably exclude.
 
[8] Cognitive Coherence and Tort Reform, Journal of Economic Psychology, 6, 2009, pp. 898-912.
 
[Appendices]
 
[Presentations: New York University, Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, November 2007; North American Regional Conference of the Economic Science Association, Tucson, September 2006.]

Abstract   

   We experimentally study the effects of the split-award tort reform, where the state takes a share of the plaintiff's punitive damage award, on litigants' beliefs and bargaining outcomes. In addition, we study the formation of litigants' beliefs in a strategic environment. Our results provide support for coherence-based reasoning theories: coherence shifts in litigants' background beliefs (elicited before a role is assigned and after commitment to a choice at the pretrial bargaining stage) suggest bi-directionality between choices and beliefs. Our findings also suggest role-specific bias in the updating of plaintiffs' beliefs about firm's negligence. Finally, our findings indicate that split-awards affect plaintiffs' beliefs about fairness and lower out-of-court settlement amounts.
 
[9] Deterrence, Lawsuits and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors, with Maxim Nikitin and Scott Baker, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 23, 2007, pp. 57-97.
 
[Presentations: Annual Meeting of the European Law and Economics Association, September 2005; 16th International Conference
on Game Theory, Stony Brook Game Theory Festival of the Game Theory Society, State University of New York at Stony Brook,
NY, July 2005; Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Philadelphia, PA, January 2005; Canadian Law and
Economics Association, Sixteenth John M. Olin Annual Conference in Law and Economics, University of Toronto, ON, September
2004; Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, University of Chile, Chile, July 2004; Summer Meeting of the Econometric
Society, Brown University, Providence, RI, June 2004.]

Abstract  

    This paper presents a strategic model of liability and litigation under court errors. Our framework allows for endogenous choice
of level of care and endogenous likelihood of filing and disputes. We derive sufficient conditions for a unique universally-divine
mixed-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium under low court errors. In this equilibrium, some defendants choose to be grossly negligent;
some cases are filed; and, some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out-of-court and some go to trial. We find that court errors in
the size of the award, as well as damage caps and split-awards, reduce the likelihood of trial but increase filing and reduce the deterrence
effect of punitive damages. We derive conditions under which the adoption of the English rule for allocating legal costs reduces filing.
 
[10] Split-Awards and Disputes: An Experimental Study of a Strategic Model of Litigation, with Linda Babcock and Maxim
Nikitin, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 63, 2007, pp. 553-572.
 
[Presentations: Center for Game Theory in Economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook,  July 2006; Australasian
Meetings of the Econometric Society, Alice Springs, July 2006; University of Victoria, Department of Economics, March 2006;
Canadian Law and Economics Association, Seventeenth John M. Olin Annual Conference in Law and Economics, University of
Toronto, ON, September 2005; Workshop on Law and Economics, North America Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society,
Brown University, Providence, RI, June 2004; Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, San Diego, CA, January 2004;
North American Regional Conference of the Economic Science Association, Tucson, AZ, October 2003]

Abstract   

   This paper studies experimentally the impact of the split-award statute, where the state takes a share of the plaintiff's punitive
damage award, on litigation outcomes. Our findings indicate that dispute rates are significantly lower when bargaining is performed
under the split-award institution. Defendants' litigation losses and plaintiffs' net compensation are significantly lower under the
split-award statute.
 
[11] Dollarization and the Inflation Threshold, with Gaetano Antinolfi and Maxim Nikitin, Canadian Journal of Economics, 40, 2007, pp. 628-649.
 
[Presentations: Midwest Macroeconomics Meetings, Washington University in St. Louis, MO, May 2006; OMD Meetings,
Aix-en-Provence, France, April 2006; Annual Congress of the European Economic Association, Universiteit van Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, August 2005]

Abstract     

    This paper analyzes the relationship among inflation, dollarization, financial intermediation, and real activity. Empirical evidence
suggests non-linearity in the effects of inflation on financial intermediation and real activity, i.e., the existence of an inflation threshold.
Evidence also suggests that one way in which inflation affects financial intermediation in highly inflationary economies is through the
substitution of dollars ``under the mattress" for savings in domestic banks. Our model captures these empirical regularities. Inflation
and real activity are positively related at low levels of inflation. When the inflation rate exceeds certain threshold, however, agents
substitute in their portfolios dollars (a non-productive liquid asset of constant value) for deposits issued by domestic banks. This
substitution reduces the scale of financial intermediation and the capital investment in the economy. As a consequence, at high levels
of inflation the levels of capital stock and output become negatively related to the inflation rate.
 
[12] Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care and Litigation Outcomes, with Maxim Nikitin, Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics, 162, 2006, pp. 571-600.
 
[Presentations: Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society, University of Chile, Chile, July 2004; University
of Calgary, Department of Economics, Calgary, AB, March 2004; Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association, San Diego, CA, January 2004; Canadian Law and Economics Association, Fifteenth John M. Olin
Annual Conference in Law and Economics, University of Toronto, ON, September 2003; Summer Meeting of the
Econometric Society, Northwestern University, Evanston. IL, June 2003; Annual Meeting of the Canadian Economic
Association, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON,  May 2003]

Abstract   

    We investigate the effect of the split-award tort reform, where the state takes a share of the plaintiff's punitive damage award,
on the firm's level of care, the likelihood of trial and the social costs of accidents. A decrease in the plaintiff's share of the punitive
damage award reduces the firm's level of care and therefore, increases the probability of accidents. The effects of split-awards on
the likelihood of trial and social costs of accidents are ambiguous. Conditions under which a decrease in the plaintiff's share of the
punitive damage award reduces the probability of trial and the social cost of accidents are derived.
 
[13] Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study of a Bilateral Bargaining Game, with Linda Babcock,  Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, Vol.53 (2004), pp. 401-417.
 
[Presentations: North American Regional Conference of the Economic Science Association, Tucson, AZ, September
2000; Applied Microeconomics Workshop, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, October 2000]

Abstract

   This paper reports the results of a bargaining experiment. We follow the pretrial bargaining model of Gertner and
Miller (1995) under uncertainty and examine the effect of a litigation institution, called a settlement escrow and
uncertainty on the timing and quality of settlement outcomes. Our findings indicate that settlement rates are significantly
higher when a settlement escrow is added to the bargaining process where there is asymmetric information.
Quality of outcomes, measured as the percentage of the true damage that the outcome represents, is positively and
significantly influenced by the addition of a settlement escrow. Settlement rates are higher when certainty is provided,
under the no escrow institution. Quality of outcomes is negatively and significantly influenced by the addition of
certainty. The escrow institution has no effect on bargaining outcomes, under the certainty condition; and, the
provision of certainty has no effect on bargaining outcomes, under the escrow institution. These findings suggest first
that the escrow is a useful device for improving efficiency when bargaining is conducted under uncertainty and second,
that the escrow fully compensates the negative effect of uncertainty on bargaining processes.
 
Manuscripts
 
[14] Playing against an Apparent Opponent: Liability and Litigation under Self-Serving Bias (with Sergei Izmalkov and Maxim Nikitin). Manuscript.
 
[15] Contracts as a Barrier to Entry: An Experimental Study of Exclusive Dealing with Stipulated Damages (with Kathryn E. Spier). Manuscript.
 
[16] Collective Bargaining Laws and Bargaining Outcomes in the Public Sector (with Maxim Nikitin). Manuscript.
 
Work in Progress
 
[17] Debiasing through Law: An Experimental Study of Unrealistic Optimism and Consumer Safety Law (with Christine Jolls, Yale Law School and NBER).

[18] Moral Hazard in Teams: An Experimental Study of Contracts under Frame Manipulations (with Kathryn E. Spier, Harvard Law School and NBER).

[19] An Experimental Study of Incentive Schemes in Lab and Field Organizations (with Ian Ayres, Yale Law School and NBER).

[20] Theory, Experiments, and the Law (with Kathryn Zeiler, Georgetown University Law Center).

[21] Liability and Disputes under Third-Party Financing of Litigation (with Maxim Nikitin, International College of Economics and Finance).

[22] Mergers, Efficiency and Market Power in the Legal Service Industry (with Layla Dotson, Northwestern University School of Law).

[23] The Evolution of the Legal Firm Business Model (with Jennifer Keber, Northwestern University School of Law).